Well-Being Freedom and The Possibility of Public-Provision Unit in Global Context

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is, first, to investigate the interconnections of substantive freedoms, which are indispensable for every individual to “lead the kind of lives they have reason to value” (Sen, 1999b, p.10,18), and which have legitimate and ethical reasons to be publicly secured, second, to investigate a conception of public-provision unit that embodies “the right to well-being freedom”, and a conception of decision-making unit that corresponds to it, based on the perspective of Sen’s capability theory and its extension, comparing with that of Rawls’ Theory of Justice and A Law of People. If we intend to construct such a public-provision unit, which conducts redistribution as a whole, and which receives every individual who cannot belong to any fixed local group, what kind of a body should we assume as a public-provision unit? And further, what kind of a body should we assume as a decision-making unit, which is responsible for deciding or revising the basic conceptions of public provision unit?