The Repugnant, the Sadistic, and Two ‘Despotic’ Conclusions in Population Ethics

Abstract

In addressing certain questions in population ethics, Derek Parfit’s ‘Repugnant Conclusion’ presents a well-known difficulty for classical utilitarianism. ‘Critical-level utilitarian’ axiologies have been proposed as a means of avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion. An objection to critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) that has been raised in the literature is the so-called ‘Sadistic Conclusion’ which it (CLU) may imply. In this paper it is contended that the Sadistic Conclusion may not be as serious a threat to CLU as it appears, and that the very terms in which the problem is posed carry within themselves the means of its resolution through compromise of a certain ‘natural’ sort. The paper also deals with two other unpleasant conclusions which could be implied by critical-level utilitarianism and critical-level generalised utilitarianism respectively. These are referred to as ‘Despotism Conclusions’, involving the according of undue power to the best-off and worst-off members of a society in determining the outcome of welfare comparisons across different populations.