# Leadership ethics and the problem of Dirty Hands in the political economy of contemporary Africa

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**RÉSUMÉ**

Cet article discute des problèmes de gouvernance et de corruption en Afrique dans le cadre d'un débat politique et philosophique large entre universalisme et relativisme, idéalisme et réalisme, ainsi que entre individualisme et communautarisme. Premièrement, je défends que l'approche réaliste de l'éthique politique et du leadership ne permet pas de différencier entre les éléments descriptifs et prescriptifs de la gouvernance et peut aisément être utilisée pour justifier « les Mains Sales » des dirigeants au nom de l'intérêt supérieur de la nation, même dans les cas où l'intérêt personnel est la seule force motivationnelle pour les actions qui sapent les codes sociaux et éthiques ordinaires. Deuxièmement, l'article montre la faillite de la confiance publique dans le gouvernement et la faiblesse de l'Etat renforce les politiques communautariennes sub-nationales qui tendent à être fondées sur l'ethnie et exclusive, et par conséquent, qui viole le cœur de l'éthique publique, c'est-à-dire l'impartialité. Finalement, l'article suggère que les principes d'éthique universels pour les services publiques soient introduits en complément plutôt qu'en concurrence avec les éthiques locales, socialement et culturellement limitée au privé. Cela requière, d'une part, que nous comprenions mieux la complexité historique, les circonstances économiques et sociales et les arrangements politiques transitionnels dans les pays africains. D'autre part, un nous devons investir dans une éducation éthique civique et professionnel réflexive qui adopte un point de vue nuancé entre le réalisme politique et l'idéalisme comme point de départ des réformes institutionnelles, aussi bien que modalité de changement des comportements à long terme.

## ABSTRACT

The article discusses problems of poor governance and corruption in Africa within the framework of wider philosophical and political debates between universalism and relativism, idealism and realism, as well as individualism and communitarianism. Firstly, the author claims that the realist approach to political and leadership ethics fails to differentiate between descriptive and prescriptive elements of governance and can thus easily be used to justify 'Dirty Hands' of the leaders in the name of the greater national good, even in cases in which self-interest is the only motivational force for actions that undermine ordinary codes of social and personal ethics by public officers. Secondly, the article shows how the failing of public trust in government and the weakness of the state further enforce sub-national communitarian politics that tend to be ethnically based and exclusive, and thus, violate the core of public ethics, that is, the requirement for impartiality. Finally, the article suggests idealistic universal principles for public (service) ethics to be introduced as complementary rather than competing with local, socially and culturally bound 'private' ethics. This requires that, on the one hand, we need to understand better the complex historical, economic and social circumstances and transitional political arrangements in African countries. On the other hand, we need to invest more in reflective civic and professional ethics education that adopts a balanced view between political realism and idealism as the starting point for institutional reforms as well as for long term attitude- and behavior- change.

**Key words**: development ethics; corruption; professional ethics

**JEL classification**: O20, D73, L29

# INTRODUCTION

In recent years in various African states there have been problems with leadership ethics, meeting international requirements of 'good governance', and fighting rampant corruption. The attempts to upgrade personal standards of behavior and integrity among public officials, decision-makers and leaders through institutional reforms, a system of codes of conduct, new regulations for wealth declarations and performance contracts or establishing anti-corruption agendas have not significantly improved the situation. Recent scandals and persistent corruption across Africa have generated debates and concerns not only about lack of political integrity and public trust in a number of African countries, but also about the justification for requiring universal and internationally applicable and assessable standards of leadership and public service ethics.

This article sets the problems of widespread poor governance and corruption in Africa within the framework of wider philosophical debates. The 'realistic' approach to political and leadership ethics fails to distinguish descriptive and prescriptive elements of governance, and can easily be used to justify 'Dirty Hands' of those in power. Secondly, the article will show how in many African states the failing of public trust in government further enforces sub-national communitarian politics of solidarity that tend to be ethnicity based and exclusive. This type of 'biased solidarity' violates the core of public ethics, that is, the requirement for impartiality. The result is a vicious circle of unjust and biased distribution of power and resources. Finally, the article will suggest how idealistic universal principles for public ethics can complement rather than compete with socially and culturally bound 'private and localized' ethics. In order to enforce impartial public ethics we need to understand the complex historical, economic and social circumstances as well as transitional political arrangements in post-colonial African countries. In addition, we need to invest in reflective civic and professional ethics education that adopts a balanced position between realism and idealism in civic, political and leadership ethics. All in all, I argue that reflective ethics education can provide a promising starting point both for pertinent institutional reforms and for social and attitude change. It creates a moral basis for a transition from a culture of impunity to increasing professionalism and the proper use of institutional structures in enforcement of political and distributive justice.

# 1. PUBLIC SERVICE, GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP ETHICS

The starting point in public service, governance and leadership ethics is public trust and professional commitment. This means that leaders and public officials, both elected and appointed, act on behalf of citizens professionally and in an impartial and ethical manner. This calls for governance that is based on honesty, accountability and responsibility on the part of office holders. Holding a public office – at any level – implies that the highest standards are expected of officials in developing and maintaining the public interest and public good. As part of the efforts to increase transparency, curb corruption and improve

personal standards of behavior many countries have introduced new codes of leadership and public service ethics, personal and collective performance contracts and various other 'anti-corruption' measures. These measures to improve public service ethics are in general seen as universal: the same values of fair and impartial distribution and accountable leadership are seen as the basic elements of 'good governance' across the globe despite the differences in any other culturally-embedded values, belief systems or traditions. In fact in pluralistic democratic systems they give the very foundations for social justice by guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of all citizens. (Cozens 1985, Abbott 1988, Burke 1986, UNPAN, OECD 2000)

Nevertheless the debate between universalism and relativism is still on-going in relation to ethics in leadership, politics and governance. This is partly due to 'a coherency problem' between various moral stands in relation to leadership and politics. As Kenneth Winston (1994) notes, while we might believe that certain ethical principles are universal, there is not one coherent moral framework that can apply simultaneously and satisfactorily to both our public as well as our private morality, and give us ethical guidelines for both the roles we hold in our personal and those we hold in our professional lives. Deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics, none of them alone can grasp the complexity of the ethical issues in our everyday reality, even if all of them grasp some central elements of human morality and the basis for our moral judgement. This incoherency of the moral frameworks in our lives creates what is often defined as the Dirty Hands dilemma between idealistic and realistic approaches, particularly in political ethics. An idealist believes that human capacities are adequate when dealing with political life, governance and leadership, and thus that absolute and universal ethical principles should apply and that leaders and civil servants should also try to live virtuous lives and set an example to the rest of the people. If leaders do not commit to an ethical life, particularly when in office but also as private persons, how can we expect others to do just that? According to idealists, the national interest and the public good can, and should be, reached by ethical means.

Realists, for their part, argue that the promotion and realization of public ethics sometimes require detachment from ordinary ethical rules and from one's private ethical principles. In other words, since the leaders and public officials need to look at the consequences of their decisions and actions in a longer and wider perspective, there may be times when unethical means are justified in order to reach ends that benefit all - or at least the majority of the citizenry. Thus, the leaders and those serving the public in various other positions may sometimes have to get their hands dirty in order to do their job properly. The 'realistic' approach to leadership and political ethics has its history in the Machiavellian account of the relation between leadership and morality. In his *The Prince* (1513) Niccolo Machiavelli noted that ordinary morality becomes irrelevant in the pursuit of power and influence. In Machiavelli's view absolutist ordinary morality would make the leader weak and unable to see what really needs to be done in order to maintain power, the unity of the state and in general the wider public interest. Since the objective of leadership is to promote the overall public interest, sometimes decisions or actions that our common morality may consider

unethical are needed (such as killing, lying, cheating, torturing).[1] We need to take a consequentialist look that allows us to use the end to justify the means. (Winston 1994)

If we set the 'realistic', more consequentialist political thinking within the African context, we notice that the Machiavellian approach has often been used to govern newly independent, ethnically fragmented and nationally and institutionally weak states in an unstable political environment. In order to keep often also unstable and fragile post-colonial states with artificially set borders together, the rulers have often used hard measures. When there does not seem to be any ideal option to choose from, those in power have made difficult decisions in ways that have violated principles of our ordinary morality, or such universal moral standards on which for example the international human rights doctrine is based on. However, while a realist approach might be a more or less rational choice in particular historical and political circumstances, it should not be turned into a pseudo-idealist view on political ethics that claims to offer the only reasonable modus operandi. Historical facts or traditions do not justify themselves by their mere existence, for that would be a naturalistic fallacy of deriving 'ought from is'. The fact that many leaders may have gotten their hands dirty in the course of history and during the struggle for independence, does not offer a plausible justification for venal and brutal power politics, which remain outside the requirements of normal ethical considerations in today's Africa. Nevertheless, many leaders and governments continue to appeal to the promotion of public interest or national security when they employ unethical means to reach their personal goals, including power mongering, corruption, stealing or mismanagement of public resources and/or violation of human rights.

A realist view of ethics in politics can too easily be used to rationalize any unethical behaviour in public office. One recent example of this could be the police commando raid to the Standard/KTN media house in Kenya in February 2006. The raid was carried out by the police special forces on the orders of government allegedly to protect national security. The fact that the raid was a violation of basic human rights and media freedom was disregarded; it was seen as a necessary 'evil' in protection of government and 'its integrity'. Such incidents are not rare in many other African states either in which bad or indifferent governance and corruption have already weakened the state institutions and where public trust is low or non-existent.

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[1] For Machiavelli, political morality not only differs from but also replaces ordinary morality. The good of the state and nation calls often for something that we could see as resembling vice in our everyday moral thinking, while something normally considered as virtue may bring a state its ruin. No matter what idealistic notions are adopted as principles of private morality, Machiavelli argued, there is no guarantee that other people will follow them, and that puts the honorable or virtuous individual at a distinct disadvantage in the real world of politics. In order to achieve success in public life, the ruler must know precisely when and how to do what no ethically virtuous person would ever do. Although private morality may rest on other factors—divine approval, personal character, or abstract duties, for example—in public life only the praise and blame of fellow human beings really counts. Machiavelli concluded that the ruler needs to acquire a good reputation while actually doing whatever wrong seems necessary in the circumstances. (Prince 17, 18). The leader needs to know when to be cruel and dishonest in order to protect his country's interests.

While we can admit that reality may be too complex to be adequately dealt with by any one idealist universalistic framework for ethics, we need not to give up on ethical ideals as such. We can still look for idealistic and universal criteria to evaluate the decisions and actions of our leaders, and in general those in public offices. These ethical criteria provide the basis for set codes of conduct, and help to prevent culture of impunity.

In summary, in post-colonial African leadership and public service, realist and idealist positions are often integrated together in a manner that creates confusion between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to morality. The fact that leaders and public office holders are sometimes put in a situation where there are no ideal or good options, does not mean that we cannot not hold them accountable for their choices and actions. From the fact that politics is sometimes a dirty game, does not follow that we should not try to agree on common and shared values that can be used as the service ideal for professionals working in the field of governance. Such moral virtues as integrity and honesty cannot be seen as typical merely to Western individualist cultures, but are essential in most, if not all, moral systems. Similarly, such ethical values and principles as political accountability, equality and impartiality are basic for building public trust within various systems of governance anywhere in the world. In practice, we can enforce these virtues, values and principles by insisting on personal accountability from public office holders if and when they break the rules and our trust, in order to remind them that they have done something that is wrong from the point of view of our ordinary moral judgement and prevailing social ethical standards. (Burke 1986, Cubbon 1993, Winston 1994)

## 2. DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF CORRUPTION, AND THE ROLE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES

Unethical practices in leadership and governance as well as self-interested profit maximization lead into systemic and institutionalized corruption in many poor African countries. The debate on the root causes, however, goes on. The main arguments are between 'greed' and 'need'. Some think that corruption is a symptom of individuals' self-interest and greediness. Others hold that the prevalence of corruption is due to low salaries, poverty and lack of resources to start with. Either way the vicious circle between poverty and corruption is evident: corruption further wastes public resources, violates citizen's equal rights and increases poverty. Simultaneously poor societies are more powerless to fight corruption efficiently. Unfair distribution of scarce resources also fuels grass-root and petty corruption since lower level officials in the public service – or just ordinary citizens – have little incentive to do their jobs well and fairly, when their leaders and others in public office are stealing state resources.

Whether we believe that corruption is caused by self-interested and egoistic human nature, by individuals' mistakes and failing virtue, by systemic failures of state institutions, by lack of resources, poverty or by bad policies, we need to recognize that our beliefs affect our efforts to fight corruption. If we believe human nature is inherently corrupt, there is

relatively little we can do to erase corruption from human behavior. Since, all efforts to enforce universal principles and codes of conduct would be 'against human nature', even the strictest laws and punishments would have little effect in the long run. One the other hand, if we are convinced that some (individual or group) of people are more corrupt than others, and that in general it is the most self-interested people who aim for public offices, we would search for ways to 'pick out the rotten apples' and replace them with individuals with higher moral standing. However, if we believe that corruption is a result of failing institutions and bad policies, which create opportunities for public officers to become thieves, we would more likely concentrate on institutional and policy reforms. Social life, however, is complex and attempts to combat corruption need to take into account various factors, circumstances and environment. Thus, we are probably better off by taking a holistic view of the problems of bad governance and corruption, and by agreeing that there are no easy answers to these problems, but that various suggested causes and cures need to be addressed in an integrated way in order to tackle the vice.

As an example of the complexity of combating corruption we can examine the long-term role of the anti-corruption legislation and agencies. First of all, it should be noted that those countries that are usually seen as least corrupt, often do not have specially targeted and highlighted anti-corruption measures. While all countries have auditors and penal codes these are seen as part of the ordinary legislation that supports political accountability, integrity and impartiality. Comprehensive constitutional legislation with a complementing penal code is usually enough to keep the hands of the public officials sufficiently clean. The problem is that when additional anti-corruption legislation or other special anti-corruption measures or institutions become a part of the permanent state operations and structures, there appears to be an assumption that the threat of corruption is a permanent threat. This would mean that corruption is seen as a part of 'normal functioning of the state'. While people will always commit crimes and break the laws, in a democratic state that abides to the rule of law in general, there should ideally be no need to establish additional and separate anti-corruption agencies. Their work is often duplicating, competing (rather than complementing) and conflicting with the work of other law enforcement agencies. When corruption has not been reduced despite some attempts, in many African countries there has been a tendency to add new agencies, strategies, and laws to the anti-corruption efforts, rather than making the existing ones more efficient or by paying more attention to their proper implementation. Anti-corruption activities have become lucrative business for many involved, particularly since people working in anti-corruption agencies are usually paid very well to avoid the temptation to be paid off by others. However, since in a manner of speaking we could claim that the main task of an anti-corruption agency is to work itself jobless, this would not appear as a promising career prospect for those who choose to make their professional lives in these institutions. Since in many countries anti-corruption officials are the highest paid, they may not be in any hurry solve the problem of corruption[2]. As long as there is acute threat of corruption and apparent events to tackle it, their own benefits are guaranteed. However, the end result of the expansion of additional anti-corruption agencies has been continuous

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[2] In Kenya, for example, the director gets a higher salary than the country's president, around 2,5 million KES. Particularly recently there has been a public outcry to decrease the salary since KACC is not seen to have produced any serious results in solving the corruption cases.

scuffle and rivalry between these institutions themselves. The combat against corruption has actually become less focused and efficient. In Kenya, for instance, investigating the recent big corruption scandals, such as the Anglo-Leasing scandal[3] in which government paid millions of dollars to non-existent, 'ghost' companies, has led to a bitter brawl between the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) and the Attorney General's Chambers. The Anglo-Leasing case files – as well as many harsh words - have been passed forward and back between these two main anti-corruption arms in the country, making both of them look incompetent and uncooperative and, thus, casting doubt on their seriousness to solve any high level political corruption cases.

The *Anti-Money Laundering Bill* that is presently under discussion in Kenya would create yet new anti-corruption agents, such as a Financial Reporting Centre, under the Ministry of Finance, as well as an Assets Recovery Agency (economic crimes asset recovery activities in general have until now been under KACC's mandate) that would be a semi-autonomous body under the office of Attorney-General. This would likely add to the constant competition between the different anti-corruption arms of law concerning their mandates, resources and public approval. (Kenya Gazeteer Supplement No. 77, Bill No. 279: The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, October 2006). The fight against corruption would be further fragmented.

A more holistic view in combating corruption would mean that legislative and institutional reforms as well as attitude and behavior change would go hand in hand, and the work of all agencies would be better coordinated. Any anti-corruption measures should be there merely to enforce other already ongoing reforms as well as to make accountable and to bring to justice those public officers and others involved in corrupt activities, while also helping in recovering stolen public assets. Put in other words, enhancing public ethics does not work if we try to pick out only the apples we see as rotten without trimming the whole tree as well as nourishing the soil it grows on – so that in the long run it no longer will produce bad apples.

## 3. CULTURE, POLITICS AND ETHNICITY IN AFRICA

The resistance by many African leaders to accept the global demand for good governance, best practices and codes of conduct is sometimes justified by appealing to traditional values and ways of governance. However, the main problem here is not that certain universal ethical solutions are not fitting to particular cultures as such. Rather it is that various historical, economic and social factors have brought different ethical understandings and

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[3] The Anglo Leasing scandal was first unearthed in 2004, and concerned dubious, multi-million-dollar contracts for supplying Kenya with a system to produce tamper-proof passports, and for building police forensic laboratories. The deals involved Anglo Leasing and Finance Limited -- a fictitious company.

Some of the money paid out in connection with this scam has been wired back to Kenya. However, authorities have failed to come clean about the names of persons responsible for the funds transfer, as demanded by rights campaigners. Other similar deals with other ghost companies were later exposed.

traditions together and created a culture of politics that tends to confuse facts with values and to integrate private and public ethics in a manner that creates a political environment in which so called traditional values tend to work against the demand for idealistic and absolute principles of public ethics.

This also relates to the often heard statement that some cultures, and particularly those traditionally collectivist cultures in Africa, are more corrupt than others. This statement yet again confuses values with traditions and practices. Traditional values may have nothing to do with the practices they are currently allegedly related to. The practices themselves have also changed during the times and got new meanings and different functions than before. Such African values as solidarity, egalitarianism and social responsibility are often related to practices that are understood or misunderstood by the international community and particularly in the West as corrupt practices. Two examples could be so called *Harambee* cooperation based on solidarity and social responsibility in Kenya, or *Takrima* as traditional hospitality in Tanzania, both traditions that are now seen to fuel corruption, particularly in relation to elections and elections campaigning. In Tanzania in April 2006 the High Court actually declared the parts of the Election Act that formally legalized *Takrima* hospitality practices during election period as null and void. Originally these traditions were to build unity in a community and to guarantee social networks and to encourage social duties of the community members. Currently, however, they are often used to raise money for political purposes or to buy votes. In the eyes of the people, however, when old and valued traditions are named as the causes of corruption, the whole culture is degraded as morally inferior.

Accepting corruption and bad governance as a part of inherited culture by tying it to traditional practices creates an impression that up-rooting corruption would require changing a particular culture as a whole rather than punishing individuals who are blatantly abusing their positions and/or reforming failing institutional structures. Labeling a culture 'corrupt' also leads easily to local resistance towards those who attempt to fight corruption and unprofessionalism, because it seems to demean local values and customs. Self-interested leaders, for their part, can easily appeal to this resistance as justification for not following any set of international standards of governance and in general for failing to tackle the problem of corruption seriously. The result is a 'culture of impunity' masked as 'respect for traditional values and practices'.

We should distinguish three very different usages of 'culture': 1)'culture as a holistic set of values and practices', values and practices which may be good or bad (for example, a culture with excessive violence and lack of respect for human dignity); 2)'bad, outdated, undesirable cultural practices' (genital mutilations, widow burning, gift giving to the local chiefs in exchange of 'political' favors); and 3) 'bad personal habits of individuals' (drug addiction, a habit of being late from appointments) and 'bad behavior of individuals' (lying, cheating, violence, escaping responsibility and blaming others).

Instead of claiming that cultures corrupt individuals, we should pay attention to the individuals whose actions 'corrupt' cultures in the long run and create institutionalized corruption. In order to avoid institutionalized and systemic corruption, we need to have a principled public ethics that clearly acknowledges what is required from leaders and officials

holding a public post. While it is true that there are cultural differences regarding the requirements of ethical norms and moral duties, this does not mean that some universal codes could not be relevant across the cultural and national borders. In all societies, and not alone in Africa, there are always the problems of divided loyalties and biased solidarities that breach the principle of impartiality and social justice.

If it is not culture that corrupts us, then why has it been so difficult for Africa to overcome the problems of corruption and enforce 'good governance' efficiently? Certainly individual people are no less ethical or committed to moral behavior there than elsewhere. As we discussed in relation to the root causes of corruption, the institutionalization of corruption is a sum of many factors. (See also Heidenheimer 1970, 1989, Heilman, Kamata and Ndumbaro 2000, LeVine 1975, Malec 1993, Nye 1967). One reason why enforcing internationally accepted public ethics codes has not yet worked well in Africa is the current ideological vacuum of African politics. Most African political parties are not promoting any clear, idealistic concept of social justice, they have no vision of an ideal leadership, and they do not provide a consistent and coherent socio-politico- economic agenda. After the fall of African socialism, it appears that leadership – or any job in public service - is seen as a way to get rich fast. There is no honor in promoting the public good, and even the representatives of the people, such as the members of parliament, boldly work merely for their own advantage. In Kenya, for example, the parliamentarians have been time after time criticized for their unreasonably high salaries and other undeserved benefits that are in no proportion to the standards of living of the rest of the country. Since in most African countries there are still no clear legal frameworks or codes of ethics that prevent public office holders from being directly involved in business positions, politicians themselves are often businessmen and women, who spend more time running their enterprises than attending to the good of their country. Since many countries in Africa face similar problems, the question remains: what has led into a situation in which politics has come to mean the personal business of public officers and has no longer much or anything to do with taking care of the national affairs?

While historical factors should not be used to justify bad governance and corruption in Africa, a brief look at the transitional politico-economic framework shows how an ideological vacuum has developed and how the individualist and communitarian politico-social positions have integrated in a social setting that is based on a 'reverse ethics' in which such central values as trust and loyalty are used to protect 'the partners in crime' and 'biased solidarity' maintains strong ties between 'old boys networks' of corruption and suspicious business.

While both systems of communitarianism and individualism support important values, such as solidarity, social responsibility and egalitarianism or respect for individual rights, equality and tolerance, when mixed together in a post-colonial political setting based on 'realism' rather than idealism, the practice tends to bring out the negative sides of both approaches. African traditional values are turned into sub-national social loyalties and individualist values are turned into to mere profit making. Let us take a look at this next. Traditional African politics are said to have their ethical foundations in values of solidarity and egalitarianism: both being values that are considered to be very different from the

individualist values of the market economy, which, for its part, promotes self-interest and individual profit maximization. So the question arises: How do these two sets of values work together in African contexts? In order to analyze the soundness of this perspective, we have to return to the roots of liberal individualism.

In the early days of liberalism and economic freedom, Bernard de Mandeville in his classic, satirical essay *The Fable of the Bees or the Private Vices and the Public Benefits*, argued that it is not hypocritical to believe 'that men can be virtuous without any self-denial'. While Aristotle and Plato reminded us that a virtuous man would never mix his private interest with the promotion of the public good, according to Mandeville we sometimes actually need private vice and private interests to maintain the public good. If we do not have people who drink wine, what happens to wineries?; if we don't have materialist consumers what happens to trade and the economy in general? If everyone is fully virtuous and lives in moderation in an Aristotelian sense how are we going to get the turnover to be collected in revenues and redistributed to the less industrious or less fortunate people? (Mandeville, 1997:131). In the Aristotelian sense the good life according to virtue is a life in which the individual as a political/social animal lives according to reason in a manner such that his activities in his public and private life bring about social harmony. Thus, if we agree with Mandeville, then what kind of vice is corruption? It appears to be a type of public vice that conflicts with the promotion of the public good (greediness as others-disregarding or others-harming egoism, i.e., self-interest that violates other individuals' rights and decreases their quality of life). It is not merely a personal vice in an Aristotelian sense. It is not a weakness of will (as for example is greediness over consumption) nor is it a sign of ignorance that nevertheless may one way or another end up promoting 'the public interest'. (Aristotle 1985, Mandeville 1997.)

Should we take Mandeville's claim seriously, then the question whether corruption is a vice that opposes civic virtue becomes more complicated. If corruption is a vice, it cannot be wholly a vice, since as an individual's vice it can also sometimes promote the public interest. Since self-interested actions and personal human desires bring about unintended stabilizing social consequences, there must be something overall positive about setting one's personal interests and desires prior to virtuous, other-regarding moderation at least every once in a while. Rather curiously then, if Aristotelian and Mandevillean views regarding the concept of (civic) virtue were integrated, people could justifiably promote their own self-interest and fall into (private) vice as long as they do so in moderation.[4]

This idea, that an individual vice of (even excessive) self-interest can be seen as the core idea of globalized market economy, is also set as a condition for development cooperation by the international community. When capitalist values and market rationalism are set to be the basic building blocks in accumulation for the public good, particularly in developing societies which have gone through sudden and radical changes in their political and economic systems, societies tend to adopt a new mixed set of values that searches for balance between economic rationality while trying to still maintain traditional ethical

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[4] This is fairly close to the view, which has recently been presented by some deontological liberal theorists such as John Rawls 1971, 1993. See also Hellsten 1998.

outlooks and communitarian cultural values. This brings Machiavellian political realism together with Mandevillean self-interested economic profit-making. From the point of view of public service, governance and leadership ethics, the result takes us even further away from ordinary, idealistic morality and further towards accepting self-interested rationality as the criterion for any ethical considerations in politics, economics and business.

## 4. FROM SOCIALIST COMMUNITARIANISM TO LIBERTARIAN COMMUNITARIANISM

Many African societies have experienced radical social transitions in a relatively short period of time during which they have tried to fit together new, mostly externally pressured political ideologies and economic policies with the requirements of traditional morality. For example during the colonial times the ethnic social hierarchies and traditional communalist and communitarian values were forced to comply with colonial authoritarianism and bureaucratic hierarchy. People were further encouraged to pass personal responsibility to those higher up in the social and professional hierarchy. Distinctive individual moral judgment from the side of the colonized was neither expected nor welcomed by the colonial rulers. (Ahluwalia 2001, Hellsten 2001a and b). After de-colonization some of the newly independent African nations started with an African formulation of socialist doctrine that, at least in principle, was returning to the traditional, communitarian African values of solidarity and egalitarianism (e.g. Tanzania, Ghana and Guinea in the 1960s). In practice, however, the one-party political systems that eventually replaced the colonial system remained authoritarian and individual citizens' rights were subordinated to the common good of the nation, as defined by the head or heads of the single party. Simultaneously notions of African socialism were used on both sides in the cold war to justify their own policies in the continent. All in all, African socialism never succeeded in awakening the desired 'traditional solidarity', but instead led into 'rational and tribally biased solidarity' as explained above. The state authoritarianism that emphasized people's social duties towards the (still often very fragile) nation (as a whole) - rather than towards each other - never worked, but instead led to ever stronger communitarian sub-national and ethnically based networks of power, favors and resource distribution which enforce black markets and weak public service.

The fall of socialism brought in the demands of neo-liberal economic systems and the requirements of the globalized individualistic values promoting individual rights and freedom along side traditional communal duties. The failing African economies and the constant demands from the international community as well as from the global markets pressured most African countries to move from centralized and controlled economies towards neo-liberal market economies (see Batley and Larbi, 2004) and from one party to multi-party democracies (Ahluwalia, 2001: 34-51, 73-86; Hellsten, 2001a, Mallya 2001b). However, even having more than one party has not brought more real choices to people. After the paradigm-shift in the global politico-economic system, which emphasizes reforms that favor a free market economy, individualist liberalism has become the precondition for African states for 'surviving' global politics and globalization in general. African nationalist,

socialist ideologists are declared 'dead', and no clear alternative ideological agenda or platforms for new political parties, movements or coalitions have been introduced or offered to guide political decisions. Neo-liberal market economics has become the 'only one and the right choice' for the global development and all African countries.

The policies of the World Bank and other Bretton Wood Institutions led to the introduction of Structural Adjustment Programmes. SAPs pushed for liberalization of economies to pave the way for private sector participation. It should be emphasized here that while the change in the economic system from centralized and planned economy to liberalized markets in many cases may be seen as a precondition for building a democratic political order, the core values of democracy and rationalist economic values do not always go hand in hand. Instead, the sudden rise of the market economy with its capitalist values tends to promote the sanctity of private property, calculating maximization of personal profits, and the cult of the market forces led by the invisible hand as presented by Adam Smith and other classic market liberals and current neo-liberals – creating individual egoism in the form of profit maximization. The main message sent through this new 'global ideology', to people who traditionally were either socialized or indoctrinated to believe in community solidarity and sharing, is that in order to survive in the midst of rapid globalization they need to adapt to individualistic promotion of self-interest, profit making and competition, while simultaneously maintaining traditional values as the backbone of local politics and social interaction. Free market economy in Africa follows the libertarian approach with minimum state interference in markets and in business in general (this, however, does not prevent politicians and government officials from taking part in business as individual players). However, the minimum state interference is seldom a deliberately chosen policy as such, but rather a result of the weakness of the young states in Africa. In summary, the lack of strong state policies, efficient and reliable service delivery as well as the absence of impartial leadership and good governance has thus led many African transitional societies to a political reality which could be labeled 'libertarian communitarianism'.

Whether an economic system as such creates or prevents corruption is an interesting question that needs to be studied further. The current studies and historical evidence are inconsistent. While the socialist states have traditionally been seen as cradles of corruption, many states in Eastern Europe and in Africa which are in transition from centralized economy to market economy claim that corruption has increased with privatization, and that the involvement of private business in government contracts and private-public partnership has produced new avenues and means for corrupt transactions and tied them more closely to other wide-scale international economic crime such as money laundering. This was one aspect of the 1980s economic crisis in most African countries that resulted in soaring unemployment and state failure in the provision of services, and led further to the explosion of informal and self-help economic and social activities. (Mallya 2001 a and b)

In principle, the individualist liberal political framework and market economy, that promotes both democracy and business, calls for a 'weaker' state that does not interfere with markets and business. This may lead into building of a strong civil society that has its own parallel system of governance and social security. The result is a situation in which people do not have any commitment or loyalty towards the state, or the government, and –vice versa – the

government does not fully acknowledge its duties towards the citizenry. The end result is a
society in which traditional support systems take over state services and focus on the family
and community networks of mutual assistance and local solidarity. In the long run this has
led into 'biased solidarity' that fuels tribalism, nepotism, cronyism, and in general favoritism
in all its forms. 'Biased solidarity' enforces loyalties within sub-national social collectives
and creates lasting rivalry between them. It creates the negative side of communitarianism
that further fragments the society in a manner that sets personal (individual and/or group)
interest above any shared national interests.

The socio-politico-economic scene is thus very complex in many young African countries
with weak state structures: traditional values themselves include a wide range of social duties
and community and family based solidarity, both of which ask individuals to care for those
close to them. In the new economic and social context which mixes the imported
individualist values with the traditionally more collectivist values, the societal ethics are
turned around: one's traditional social duties become part of the scope of one's private
morality and the individualist requirements of impartiality and autonomy are to be the basis
of the public ethics. However, if public ethics fails and the government and the public
service at large violate the trust of the people and fail to deliver impartially what is expected
from them, people turn back to their traditional social values and security networks[5]. And
people in power and politics look for their support from their social and ethnic communities
rather than from the national majority. All in all, politics do not take into account any set
political agendas, shared ideologies and/or commonly agreed principles of justice. Instead,
they rely on mutual assistance and loyal support by those who come from smaller groups
with shared histories, traditions and social hierarchies. Should be added that this situation is
not merely typical for Africa but resembles the situation in 17th and 18th century Europe.
However, the success in building of strong and relatively ethnically homogeneous nation
states with a share vision for the common good gradually changed the situation.

In Africa, however, the states remain weak without national political visions. Politics in
many African societies, individualistic self-interest is now mixed with communal loyalties
rather than with the public good of the nation as a whole. When communitarian social
commitments are integrated with Mandevillean economic rationality as well as with neo-
Machiavellian political realism the political battlefield turns literally into the survival of the
fittest. There is no room for new political idealism and political ideologies, for there are no
shared values other than self-interest and quick profit, and no long-term plans and principled
directions. In many parts of Africa today politics are based on 'quick personal wins' of those
competing for positions: everyone wants everything here and now!

As noted before in many parts of Africa politics tend to be ethnic, not ideological. Usually a
leader either builds a majority ethnic coalition or a minority coalition that retains its
solidarity out of fear of the majority. For example in Kenya, political parties are based on
ethnic and other social loyalties rather than political platforms: they have no political, leave
alone ethical, profile but are personified by their leaders. These individuals, for their part,

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[5]African socialism was, in its theory, particularly based on reviving the tribal traditions of egalitarian
solidarity and small community self-reliance, see Ahluwalia 2001, Nyerere 1968, also Hellsten 2001.

use political parties as means to advance their personal goals and hunger for power. Individuals leap from one party to another easily, based on their evaluations of what they can personally gain from alternative networks of power and reciprocal favors. Communitarian solidarity mixed with individualist self-interest has created powerful social networks in Kenyan politics as well as elsewhere in Africa. These networks enforce 'biased solidarity' because they aim towards personal benefits and limited communal advantage, rather than the common good of all citizens. Simultaneously, the power and political future of the leaders and others competing for public offices now depends on the support of these networks. Reciprocal inter-dependency has been created: people have to rely even on crooked leaders in order to guarantee resources for particular ethnic groups or geographical areas, while the leaders need to maintain their support among their 'own people'. In the end politicians as well as the electorate both lose their independence and possibilities for autonomous decision-making. (See also Rogow and Lasswell 1963, Sengupta 1982)

In a typical African context self-interested rationality is set in a collective context and as Charles Khamala (2007) notes, this creates a new type of prisoner's dilemma scenario. Individuals who act rationally to advance their own self-interest will together sacrifice individual autonomy for the greater good of their restricted communities. In the African context where each individual voter experiences a vicarious kinship relation with their elected members of parliament, one tends to elect a clansman or relative to articulate or represent tribal or group interest at national forums. No competent candidate from a smaller tribe, community or clan is likely to emerge victorious. The merits of the candidates' political ideology, agenda or programme remain of secondary interest at best and downright irrelevant at worst. This creates a political context in which ideologies or planning for comprehensive national political agenda becomes futile. While the tribal criteria used to select the individual's best interests appear irrational from the perspective of Western voting theory, in the African electoral context a voter from a large tribe or clan lives well by not asking how his or her vote will provide the maximum impact to him(her)self but rather calculating how the tribal, group or collective interest might best be achieved by a tribalised leader. Voting patterns thus usually reflect candidates chosen from big tribes or regions who are considered more likely to advance the parochial rather than abstract, wider national interest. Political coalitions are formed on the same principle, by bringing together tribes that cannot manage to get enough loyalty votes within their own ethnic support base, but need other smaller tribes to expand their scope of ethnic support. As a result, formal development polices are likely to be subordinated to demands of the patronage politics of rewarding relatives with public resources in order to entrench, perpetuate and reproduce cultural patterns of historical injustices. (Khamala 2007, 9) Political ideologies do not provide national political platforms or frameworks; instead global economic realities and power structures give the frameworks that an African electorate has to live with in the international context.

All in all, communitarian values of solidarity and egalitarianism are merged with market rationality based on self-interest and the result is political competition that aims for personal profits and is based on tribalism, cronyism, nepotism and favoritism. These rival communities of strong loyalty are the main obstacle to building and enforcing impartial public ethics as well as in uprooting corruption, whether they are ethnic or based on religion, professional loyalty or any other uniting factor that excludes members of other social

collectives from the same benefits or chances to power. Sometimes the loyalties of closed networks can cross borders of traditional, ethnic or religious communities and those in power in these communities may team up together to maintain the status quo in a manner that enforces their personal power. Thus, besides the tribal national voting patterns there is often another underlying layer of power politics that advances the benefits of just few individuals. These individual leaders can work together despite their different ethnic backgrounds in order to make power sharing deals and coalitions depending on how this cooperation serves their personal gain - rather than the final benefit of their supporting ethnic communities.

## 5. THE COMPETITION BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ETHICS

For trying to find ways to combat corruption in Africa, we can summarize the earlier discussions as follows: First, there is the clash between African socialist ideology and capitalist value systems as such. In general this means public manager's ethical commitments are now more and more clearly market-oriented: oriented towards market-derived ends rather than egalitarian or re-distributive justice. The leaders and public administrators do not aim to promote the good of the greatest number of the citizens, but instead to maximize the good of those who are essential for them to maintain their power. Economic growth benefits few and so called wealth creation has often nothing to do with poverty reduction. (Virtanen 2003, 330).

Second, both the traditionally communalist as well as the capitalist value systems themselves in some respect conflict with the democratic values of equality and agent autonomy that are based on the principle of impartiality. Impartiality, ideally, promotes moral autonomy and individual choices while it simultaneously asks us not to set our personal benefits (such as free market rationalism) or our private moral commitments (such as communitarian solidarity) above the promotion of the public good. While a capitalist theorist may claim that capitalism is based on autonomy and impartiality, the practice is rather different and the ideal of profit maximization may easily lead into temptation to use one's office for personal gain. Whether in judicial system, state bureaucracy, education, or health, those who learn to use their power and position for personal wealth creation, are sometimes looked upon as the clever ones who know how to work the system. And even the action of some leaders may not have been approved by the people (like for example Moputo SeseSeko in Zaire, or Idi Amin Dada in Uganda) it was seen as 'realistic' and natural show of egoistic nature of human being. Many dictators who abused their power and the resources of their countries but some of whom were also doing business with the international partners including Western powers.[6]

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[6] Mobutu, originally enjoying warm relations with the US, Belgium and France, faced many challenges particularly early in his rule, but most opposition he was able to coopt into submission through patronage; those he could not, he dealt with forcefully. In 1966, four cabinet members were arrested on charges of complicity in an attempted coup, hastily tried by a military tribunal, and publicly executed in an open-air spectacle witnessed by over 50,000 in attendance. By 1970, nearly all

When we live in a pluralist and democratic society people have many different moral outlooks that are influenced by the differences in our beliefs, value systems, spiritual commitment and cultural traditions. These all affect what we consider as acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. However, at the same time, the promotion of the public good requires that we accept some general principles such as equality and impartiality as the basis for the public morality.

However, when the state itself is weak and its leadership and governance systems cannot be trusted, civil society as the collection of communities with internal and reciprocal loyalties adopts its own internal codes of ethics. As noted earlier this situation tends to 'reverse' what we consider to be the requirements between the public and private moralities  (Appleby 1987, 25-35, Dayles 1989, Chapman 1993, Cubbon 1993). In order for everyone to get their share private communal, ethnic and other forms of networks are developed to guarantee 'fair' distribution of power and resources. This is no longer merely a conflict of interest between public and private professional and social obligations, but it is much wider confusion over what kind of ethical systems are needed for governance and resource distribution in national context. Simultaneously it is also competition between very different politico-economic systems with distinct approaches to morality and the demands of social and personal ethics.

Contemporary post-colonial societies in Africa have become free markets also for various values and belief systems; there is something for everyone but no general ideological and ethical direction that would bring these different views or ethnic identities together under common goals and shared ideals. When the common understanding of the core moral values and principles is lost, striving for any comprehensive public ethics inevitably weakens [what?] further. In a situation in which the private moral commitments have priority over the standards of public ethics or professional commitments, there might still be a certain level of predictability (of people taking bribes when offered) of our actions. However, this predictability is based on what may be called 'negative trust', that is, accepting the fact that you cannot trust state services to deliver or any public office to do their job efficiently and professionally without extra reward or pay. At the same time you trust that nobody will report anyone else, since these payments are the way to make ends meet and to keep the systems, including the public delivery services, working at all.

This situation of negative trust undermines the requirements of public ethics and creates an ethical structure that we can call 'reverse ethics'. This means that such central values as loyalty, trust and solidarity ensure that 'the partners in crime' are not exposed and that the 'old boys networks' remain untouchable. Those who might make the mistake of promoting the national good and unveiling corruption and other forms of unprofessional behavior now find themselves in a difficult position. Not going along with the commonly accepted unprofessional and unethical practices and causing problems to 'well working corrupt systems' may cost them their job, their social 'respect', their promotion, even their health, or

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potential threats to his authority had been smashed, and for the most part and rather in principle as claimed by Moputo himself, law and order was brought to nearly all parts of the country.

in the worst case, their life. This is mafia type 'reversed social ethics' which labels those who fight against corruption and other practices or actions considered unethical in our normal moral thinking as 'the bad guys' who break 'the circle of trust'. Instead of seeing those seriously combating corruption as 'the good guys' who are promoting the public interest, the rule of law and citizens' equal rights, they are made to appear disloyal and/or self-interested.[7] Time after time it has become clear that in many African countries (as well as elsewhere like for example Russia) it really does not pay to stand for public ethics or to blow the whistle. Rather individuals' attempts to enforce impartiality and ethical behavior in general may lead into a personal disaster or even loss of one's life. Very recently in Kenya, the whistle blowing by John Githongo (former Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance in the President's Office) which revealed government's involvement in corruption is just one example of this. After he exposed corrupt transactions and networks in the Anglo-Leasing deals the government has often labeled Githongo as a traitor who is a threat to national security. His actions in corruption revelations are said to bring shame to the country's reputation and cast a shadow on the good image of the government.

## 6. HOW TO REVERSE 'REVERSE ETHICS'?

In order to find a way to turn a society with 'reverse ethics' around, to enforce universal principles in leadership ethics, and to find binding codes of conduct for public service in general, we need to find a balance between realism and idealism particularly in relation to the integration of communitarian and individualist practices at state level. There is a need to find impartial respect and concern for all in wider society: there is a need for agreeing on idealistic ethical standards that apply to all, such as human rights ideology and human rights approach to development, for example, can offer. In order to find such agreement we can start by looking at the core values of democracy that themselves call for impartiality and social justice. While democracy does not always in practice realize these values, there is no reason why its institutions should not be restructured in a way that aims to bring democratic values about. Similarly while human rights principles may have been violated in practice, this does not make them futile but rather demands us to find better ways to implement them. Democratic _forms and_ _practices_ of majority vote, individual rights, free and fair elections, multiparty system and freedom of expression alone cannot guarantee a corruption free society with 'good systems of governance' and a country's leadership's commitment to personal ethics, social justice and impartial realization of human rights. Thus, in order to move up from localized ethics and communal ties, we need to reconsider what democracy means in its idealistic form and we need to remind ourselves of the core _values_ of democratic processes that all public officials should aim for.

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[7] For instance the Tanzanian agents for prevention of corruption are often seen as presenting the controlling eye of the 'big brother'. Their attempts to prevent corruption may be also seen as an attempt to exercise authority in the lives of ordinary citizens who merely attempt to make ends meet with illegal or semi-legal activities and flexible use of their official positions.

Maybe the simplest way to talk about public morality is to refer to the democratic value of equality of individuals as autonomous moral and political agents. Equality and autonomy can be promoted in a democracy (whether we talk about liberal, social, communitarian or any other kind of democratic system) only if the requirement of impartiality is respected in order to promote the overall interest of the public. Understanding of the practical measures needed to realize these values varies according to circumstances and cultural backgrounds.

 In philosophical terms public morality requires, firstly, a utilitarian principle of the promotion of the public good or the maximization of the good of the greatest number in a society. Second, it follows the liberal principle, maybe most elaborately presented by John Stuart Mill (1986) and rather more recently by John Rawls (1971, 1993). These frames for public morality introduce the principle of impartiality in their demand that the promotion of the public good should not endanger or violate the protection of the rights of the individual members of a society. In general this demand for impartiality is based on the value of equality, which requests that everybody should receive the same treatment on the same basis.

The core values of democracy, impartiality and moral autonomy are also the basic principles of public ethics and professionalism in any sector. But what makes realization of these values difficult is that the values themselves can also conflict with each other when it comes to the role of one's autonomous moral judgment in democratic decision-making. Autonomy is needed in all moral decisions: for instance, when a public servant has to refuse to follow the orders of his or her superior if these orders are clearly unprofessional, unlawful or otherwise unethical, (s)he has to make an independent judgment of what is right and wrong in this particular context. However, with the social pressures from colleagues who are tied in to corrupt networks or to the wider system of favoritism, truly autonomous choices are hard to make. New governments tend to inherit these corrupt networks from the previous ones and even the most serious reforms easily die once the 'corruption fights back' for its survival.

The other central task is to understand the importance of professionalism and the public ethics that enforce professionalism in leadership and governance in all sectors of public service. All professions, including governance, have service ideas that are part of the set of values that helps a democratic society to work: medicine aims for health, law for justice, media for truth, education for wisdom – and governance for **the public good**. If these service ideas are forgotten, professions lose their functional meaning in a society and professionals lose the basis for their professionalism and professional ethics. While unprofessionalism in the public service may start modestly with small conflicts between the requirements of public and private moralities and slip away from the requirement, without any control mechanisms it can lead into endemic corruption and an endless web of favors and counter-favors creating strong requirements of 'negative loyalty and trust'. (Abbott, 1988; Bayles, 1989; Cohen, 1995; Cubbon, 1993). This applies both to ordinary citizens, public servants and people in leadership positions. The closer and more personal the commitments that we have at stake, the more difficult it becomes to be an impartial professional. As recent scandals in some African countries suggest, many leaders and even those in the highest political and public positions are so deeply tied to various communitarian pressure groups that they are unable to make independent and/or ethical choices but are 'prisoners' of the

webs of systemic corruption and biased solidarities even despite their original will for ethical leadership and change.

The requirements of impartiality and autonomy go hand in hand in public morality and professionalism. They together require that an individual makes choices, which remain impartial despite the pressures that are put upon him or her either by the work environment, or by private commitments and ties. This applies also to 'whistle blowing' and other reporting of engagement in corrupt or unethical activities.[8] The question that we face now is whether the choice made under social pressure can any longer be considered autonomous? The most difficult part of being autonomous probably is to recognize when one's decisions really are impartial in any given context. Thus, it is important to institutionally provide a legal and political framework which encourages independent decision-making and protects those who take the first steps to break the institutionalized social expectations. Legal and institutional frameworks, however, do not work alone if there is no reflective education on professional and civic ethics taking place at the same time. The reform thus needs to be holistic and it needs to tackle all the different angles and dimensions of corruption at the same time. Strategies for such reforms need to be comprehensive and set clear priorities and benchmarks for progress. Creating new institutions is unlikely to work, if the previous ones have not been able to set in motion also attitude change in a wider social and politico-economic context. Such a change is unlikely to take place unless public trust is returned and some common values and shared goals for social justice are introduced to bring the society together once more.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that when leadership, governance and public service ethics are discussed we need to balance between 'realist' and idealistic approaches in a manner that helps us to make a clear distinction between facts and values, between practices we engage in and the service-ideals of our positions. It also looked at both communitarian and individualist values as well as at practices when these values are not acknowledged or clearly understood by the leaders or the citizenry. Part of the efforts to improve compliance to public service ethics need to include not just socialization of public office holders to their roles, but also support mechanisms and strategies as well as legislative measures to address conflicts between politico-economic systems, and between public morality and private morality. And finally, these measures also need to build accountability that prevents the Dirty Hands in political morality turning into a culture of impunity, and they must require professionalism in relation to the realization of democratic values.

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[8] For instance in a society with collective values, the Anti Corruption Programme officers themselves sometimes have difficulties in acting on reports that involve people (whether these people are the ones reporting or have been reported) they are related to by family or community ties. Based on discussions with Prevention of Corruption Bureau officers in Tanzania, 2001-2002.

We can promote 'professionalism' by encouraging people to do their jobs according to particular ethical standards while simultaneously showing them that professionalism does not mean that they would have to abandon their ethical beliefs and social commitments, or traditional values that they have learnt to rely on. Teaching the codes of ethics of various professions is one step in enforcing the individual accountability and personal responsibility of individuals as public servants as well as citizens and all other professionals.

Merely following the professional codes of conduct does not prevent corruption from occurring, particularly in many poor countries in which corruption has penetrated all the levels and sectors of society. In such societies it is as essential to educate people about the core meaning of democratic values as the core of public morality. In order for democracy to work in very different types of societies, the citizens have to recognize their personal rights and responsibilities as political and moral actors: their right to demand just, corruption-free governance and their responsibilities in building a corruption-free society based on professionalism.

Thus, particularly in countries in which corruption is institutionalized, civic ethics education should go hand in hand with the teaching of professional ethics to ensure a wider diffusion of public ethics and values in society. While it is vital that public servants in the highest offices need to commit themselves to the public good and the principle of impartiality in delivering it, current approaches tend to rely heavily on the measures taken directly towards the leadership, the political and bureaucratic elite, leaving the role of those victimized by bad governance and corruption marginal. Therefore, it is important that values and ethics are internalized by ordinary public servants and citizenry as a whole, through programmes of civic education that involve the broader civil society, private sector and professional communities. Only then can many developing societies move from the local and limited promotion of the common good to the national promotion of the public good.

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